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POWER OF CONTRACT AND AGREED REMEDIES
Ian R. Macneilt
INTRODUCTION

Power of contract is one of the two sides of freedom of contract. On
one hand, freedom of contract is a freedom from restraint, an immunity
from legal reprisal for making or receiving promises. On the other hand,

it is not really a freedom of contract, but a power of contract, a power
to secure legal sanctions when another breaks his promise.'
It is this second side of freedom of contract, the power of contract,
to which writers refer when they make statements such as the following:
"The non-enforcement of penalties and forfeitures is a limitation on

freedom of contract and is based upon the notions of public policy held
by courts of equity."' The question to be explored is whether there is in
fact a clash of policies in nonenforcement of penalties and forfeitures
and other agreed remedies. More specifically, in such cases are the
functions of the social tool of contract actually in conflict with "notions

of public policy held by courts of equity," i.e., prevention of harshness
and overreaching? Or is nonenforcement of certain agreed remedies a

tacit recognition that the functions of contract can be achieved in those
cases in spite of the nonenforcement of those particular remedies?
A consideration of the functions of contract will show that the conflict

is more apparent than real.
By its nature a power to compel and any basic rights to enjoy such
t See contributors' section, masthead p. 631, for Biographical data.
1 This duality of freedom of contract is analyzed in 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1376 (1951)
[hereafter cited as Corbin].
The use of the word "freedom" to describe a power to compel may be confusing, but the
usage is not as anomalous as first appears. Contract has been and is an extremely flexible
libertarian instrument for arranging social and economic relationships. It has the capacity
of utilizing and channeling legal authority so that society can operate with a relative
minimum of limitation on the freedom from restraint of its members. In view of the
function of contract in the preservation of freedom it is not surprising that rights to
its availability came to be known as freedom of contract.
2 5 Corbin § 1055; see also § 1057.
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power cannot be unlimited, even theoretically.3 To mean anything, therefore, a power to compel must be defined. How we define power of
contract depends upon how we define contract. The language quoted
above that the nonenforcement of penalties and forfeitures is a limitation on power of contract suggests a very broad definition of that
power and thereby of contract itself. It contains the implication that
at least any promise seriously meant is a contract and that failure to
enforce such a promise is a restriction on the power of contract. It is
certainly possible to define contract as any promise seriously meant,4
and to hold a refusal to give legal sanctions for breach of any such
promise to be an infringement of the power of contract. Under such a
definition a refusal to enforce a penalty clause would be an abridgement
of the power of contract, just as would be refusals to enforce promises
in restraint of trade or to commit crimes, yellow dog contracts, unconscionable contracts, and at least some social promises and promises
lacking formal requisites such as consideration. 6 So too, refusals to
grant specific performance could infringe the power of contract whenever
the ground for doing so is something other than the adequacy of damages.
But is it true, in Anglo-American law at least, that society intends,
even in the most general terms, that sanctions be available for all seriously
meant promises? or that the goal of contract sanctions is to insure actual
performance of promises? In light of the doctrine of consideration and
of other prerequisites to legal enforcement of promises, and in view of
our predominantly substitutional remedies, i.e., money damages, the
answer to both questions is "no."
It is possible to define contract and thereby power of contract in
some manner which comes closer to the facts of legal life than the definition suggested above. Any extended discussion, however, of the much
debated question, "Why are promises given sanctions?" is out of place
here. Nevertheless, the working hypothesis of this artcle is that promises
3 Unless, of course, they are concentrated exclusively in one all-powerful individual
in the society.
4 The most common definitions of contract reveal little on this point since they are
tautological. For example:
"A contract is a promise . . . for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or
the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." 1 Williston,
Contracts § 1, at 1 (3d ed. 1957) [hereafter cited as Williston (3d ed.)]; Restatement,
Contracts § 1 (1932).
5 Others besides Corbin, see note 2 supra, having so described it. See, e.g., McCormick,
Damages § 147 (1935) [hereafter cited as McCormick]; Brightman, "Liquidated Damages,"
25 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (1925). Similar concern is expressed in French law over the
apparent threat to sanctity of contract. Benjamin, "Penalties, Liquidated Damages and
Penal Clauses in Commercial Contracts: A Comparative Study of English and Continental
Law," 9 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 600 (1960).
6 Social promises and promises lacking formal requisites may or may not be contracts
as defined above since they may or may not be seriously meant.
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are given sanctions to protect reliance on promises and to' prevent
unjust enrichment.7 A further premise is that expectancies are enforced
to protect hidden or unprovable reliance (such as unprovable lost
opportunities), to give added protection to reliance, thus encouraging it
to occur, 8 and to prevent gain through breach. 9 In terms of these alleged

purposes of the courts we can define a contract as follows:
A contract is a promise given legal sanctions adequate (1) to protect
proven reliance on the promise by the promisee; (2) to prevent gain by
default on the promise,' 0 and (3) to effectuate expectancies created by the
promise (a) where there may be hidden or unprovable reliance'1 or
(b) where socially desired reliance' 2 may thereby be promoted.
7 See generally Fuller and Perdue, "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages," (pts.
1-2) 46 Yale LJ. 52, 373 (1936-37).
8 Ibid.
9 It is another question whether the factor of potential gain through breach has
worked indirectly, in unacknowledged ways. I suggest that it has, and that it has
probably been a powerful factor in establishing the promisee's expectancy as the
normal and accepted measure of damages for breach of contract.
Dawson, "Restitution or Damages?," 20 Ohio St. L.J. 175, 187 (1959).
Of course, promises can be enforced for purposes other than preventing unjust enrichment or protecting and encouraging reliance, hidden or otherwise. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter suggests another purpose in Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S.
407, 419 (1947). There the Court struck down a clause in a government contract which
it held to -be a penalty. In a dissenting opinion Frankfurter argued that "if this contract
were an ordinary commercial contract subject to the ordinary rules of the law of contract"
the clause would be unenforceable. He goes on, however, to point out that "the
Government may certainly assure performance of contracts upon which the effective
conduct of the war depended by tightening the consequence of non-performance. .. 2'
See also 5 Corbin § 1055. Frankfurter is suggesting that an additional purpose to be
effectuated is that actual performance and production be achieved.
In the Communist states where emphasis is on production, 'breach of a production
contract is something more than a failure of a duty to the other party, it is a wrong
against the state. In other words production contracts are not thought of as arrangements between autonomous units, in which society's only interest is in providing
sanctions to aid in the achievement of certain goals desired by the parties. Rather such
contracts are part of an overall social plan of production in which actual performance
in accordance with the plan of the state is the goal. This difference in goals leads to
quite different attitudes toward penalty clauses in contracts. See Schlesinger, Comparative

Law 332-335 (2d ed. 1959). Indeed, failure to meet production goals, including, presumably, contractually promised ones, in the past at least, often led to far harsher
sanctions than monetary penalties. The increasing availability of specific performance
with its potential threat of contempt seems to be moving American contract law in
the direction of insuring production rather than of merely protecting and encouraging
reliance and preventing unjust enrichment. For review of that trend see Van Hecke,
"Changing Emphases in Specific Performance," 40 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1961). In American
law, too, the allowance of punitive damages for breach of contract does more than
protect the reliance, restitution, and expectancy interests, but such awards are available
in only a few situations. 5 Corbin § 1077; 5 Williston, Contracts § 1340 (rev. ed. 1936-38)
[hereafter cited as Williston (rev. ed.)]; Simpson, "Punitive Damages for Breach of
Contract," 20 Ohio St. L.J. 284 (1959). For a recent abortive attempt to give punitive
damages for breach of a collective bargaining contract see United Shoe Workers v.
Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960), rev'd 298 F.2d 277 (3d.Cir. 1962);
noted in 47 Cornell L.Q. 112 (1961); 13 Stan. L. Rev. 950 (1961).
10 It may be that this too will call for the effectuation of an expectancy.

11 Possible hidden or unprovable reliance is most commonly found in promises
transferring market risks. It is so common in such transactions that practically no one
except law professors and their students even think about it; everyone else simply
assumes that an expectancy recovery is the only rational protection of contractors in
such cases.
12 Of course, not all reliance on promises receives the added protection of the en-
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This definition sets forth what are, at least arguably, the general
purposes of society in enforcing contracts through its courts. It also
narrows the definition of power of contract. Power of contract becomes
the availability to a promisee of legal sanctions adequate to protect his
reliance on the promise, to prevent gain by default, and to effectuate
expectancies where there may be hidden or unprovable reliance.13 Thus,
where legal sanctions are not adequate, this power of contract is curtailed.
The curtailment is a minor one if he is permitted to use self-help, for
example, agreed remedies, to make them more adequate, but the curtailment is a serious one if the legal sanctions are not adequate and he is
not permitted to use self-help to make them more adequate. On the
other hand, there is no curtailment of his power of contract if he is
not permitted to use self-help when the law already gives him sanctions
4
adequate to achieve the purposes listed.1
When we consider agreed remedies, the foregoing definition of contract
enables us to change our focus from the alleged conflict between a
policy favoring freedom of contract (in the power sense) and a policy
of preventing harsh bargains. This is advantageous in avoiding the
many associations of this conflict with matters having nothing to do with
agreed remedies. Instead we can focus on the question: Does this agreed
remedy fill an inadequacy of the law in giving protection to the promisee's reliance, in preventing gain by the defaulter and in effectuating
expectancies where there may be hidden reliance?' 5 If the answer is
"yes," the purposes of contract law require giving effect to the agreed
remedy. If the answer -is "no," they do not.
forcement of expectancies. The phrase "socially desired" is simply a shorthand way
to distinguish between that which does, e.g., reliance in commercial transactions, and
that which may not, e.g., Johnny's buying a new Cadillac in reliance on a promise by
Uncle to give him $25,000. See the famous dialogue between Mr. Coudert and Mr.
Williston, A.L.I. Proceedings, Vol. IV, Appendix (1926) 98-99, 103-04.
13 This definition of power of contract omits reference to legal sanctions adequate
to effectuate expectancies for the purpose of promoting socially desired reliance. Although
strictly speaking such sanctions should be included to do so would confuse the
discussion and lead to question begging. If such notions of social desirability are
sufficiently particularized no refusal to enforce an expectancy in the absence of hidden
or unprovable reliance would constitute an infringement of power of contract. For
example, reliance on a liquidated damage clause is desirable, but reliance on a penalty
is not. It is therefore assumed throughout the balance of the article that power of
contract does not include the availability of sanctions, the sole purpose of which is to
effectuate expectancies in order to promote socially desired reliance. This excision is
far less sweeping than at first appears. It is a rare case in which there is reliance clearly
recognized as socially desirable, for example, in commercial transactions, which does not
also involve hidden or unprovable reliance, for example, possible lost opportunities to
enter other transactions. Such cases of course call for the effectuation of expectancies
without inquiring into the positive social desirability of the reliance.
14 It is true of course that the promisee is denied powers which the law might otherwise provide, but they are not powers of contract.
1 Hereinafter these factors will be referred to as the promisee's reliance, restitution,
and expectancy interests.
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The following sections will develop the relationship of this definition
to penalties and liquidated damages, penal bonds, forfeitures, and other
efforts to provide for the consequences of breach, such as clauses concerning specific performance, attorneys' fees, and arbitration.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGE S AND PENALTY CLAUSES

This section deals with executory clauses, 6 where the stipulated
remedy is enforceable only if the court adds its sanctions. This is in
contrast to forfeiture clauses in which the defaulter seeks return of
something of value. Thus this section concerns plaintiffs wronged by
a breach of contract who seek enforcement of a stipulated remedy,
or defendants who seek to limit recovery to such an amount.'
Is power of contract as defined above infringed by the refusal of the
court to enforce a penalty clause? As to the base promise' the answer
is "no," so long as the court provides sanctions adequate to protect
the reliance, restitution, and expectancy interests of the promisee created
by that base promise. Yet the penalty clause itself is a promise, and
there are no sanctions supplied for its enforcement. Nevertheless, the
foregoing interests are generally given adequate legal sanctions even
though this particular clause is given none.
For example, assume an obviously unenforceable penalty clause: a
promise to pay $500 as a penalty upon failure to repay a $100 loan on
its due date a year hence. It is most unlikely that the promisee-creditor
relies on the penalty clause in such a case because the promisee's reliance
is on the base promise to pay the $100 loan. The promisee may hope
for a breach, but by lending money to the promisor on the base promise,
he has been willing to rely on it. The penalty is only additional in
terrorem security for the performance of that base promise. Insofar as
the borrower-promisor knows before the due date that the court will
not enforce the penalty, the lender-promisee loses that security, and his
power of contract is infringed. The reliance on this security, however,
seems rather slight. There are, thus, no substantial provable reliance
16 Hereinafter often called agreed damage clauses to avoid the built-in determination
of invalidity or validity implied by the words penalty and liquidated damages.
17 It should be noted that a good deal of authority dealing with executed agreed
remedies, e.g., deposits, is a fortiori authority for executory agreed damages clauses.
Cases dealing with the former are often cited without distinction from those dealing
with the latter. Thus a decision requiring repayment of a deposit would be authority
for striking down an executory agreed damages clause in similar circumstances, but the
converse is not necessarily true. Cf. 5 Corbin § 1063, at 309. For this reason executory
and executed clauses are treated separately herein, although the decisions on these
questions are often cited and used interchangeably.
18 The words "base promise" are used to describe the substantive parts of the
contract, i.e., all material agreements and terms of condition, other than the agreed
remedy, i.e., penalty clause.
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losses to reimburse, and refusal to enforce the penalty does not constitute
infringement of the power of contract on the ground of inadequate protection of reliance. Nor, since the law provides sanctions which will
deprive the defaulter of any enrichment gained by his breach, is the
promisee deprived of the power of contract on this ground.
So, too, with the expectancy created by the promise to pay the penalty.
Unless the promise to pay the penalty involves hidden or unprovable reliance, refusal to enforce the penalty will not constitute curtailment of
the power of contract. As suggested above, such promises do not seem
to involve hidden or unprovable reliance. For example, the expectancy created by the penalty clause is unlike that of the base promise,
it has nothing to do with the shifts of market risk, etc. The market
economy thus provides no institutional reason for protecting this expectancy. Thus the refusal to enforce the expectancy of payment of a
penalty is no infringement of the power of contract.
But if there should be substantial provable or hidden reliance on the
"4penalty" clause, i.e., the promisee thinks at the time that the deal is
made, that the base promise will not be performed, then we have alternative base promises, rather than simply an additional sanction for
performance of one base promise. If there is such reliance on the alternative promise, we are no longer dealing with a penalty but with alternative contracts, 19 and failure to enforce the alternative promise will
result in an infringement of power of contract.
The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that if contract is
defined in certain purposive terms rather than in traditional systematic
terms, the general rule invalidating penalty clauses is not an infringement
of the power of contract 2 0 The conclusion is, however, a useless abstraction unless the courts (or other lawmakers) are upholding those
stipulated remedies clauses where the law does not give sanctions adequate to protect the reliance, restitution and expectancy interests, and
19 5 Corbin § 1070. In Campbell Discount Co., v. Bridge, [19611 2 Weekly L.R.
596 (C.A.), criticized 24 Modern L. Rev. 502, 507 (1961), the court erroneously
treated the agreement as an alternative contract, rather than as providing a penalty.
And in Caplan v. Schroeder, 56 Cal. 2d 515, 364 P.2d 321 (1961) the court treated as an
invalid forfeiture what might very well have been given effect as an alternative
contract.
20 If this conclusion is correct, France goes well beyond what is necessary to effectuate
power of contract in its law of penalties, since penalties are enforced without much,
if any, regard to reliance or expectancy losses or to enrichment of the defaulter. See
Schlesinger, Cases on Comparative Law 328-31 (2d ed. 1959); Marsh, "Penal Clauses
in Contracts: A Comparative Study," 32 J. Comp. Leg. & Int'l L., 66, (1950). There
are however specific rules in French law which in many instances effect results
consistent with the conclusion in the text. Comment, "Penal Clauses and Liquidated Damages, a Comparative Survey," 33 Tul. L. Rev. 180, 183 (1958).
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striking them down where it does. With some aberrations this seems to
be substantially what the courts are doing.
The problem is to determine what agreed damages the courts enforce
and in what situations they refuse to enforce such agreements.'
Uncertainty of Damages
It is widely stated and held that for an agreed damages provision
to be upheld it must appear at the making of the contract that the harm
which would be likely to flow from the breach would be impossible or
difficult to estimate.2 2 This doctrine has been criticized by Professor
21 As the perusal of any recent literature on the point indicates, there are some live
issues in this question. See, e.g., Alder v. Moore, [1961] 2 Weekly L. R. 426 (C.A.); noted in
77 L.Q. Rev. 300, 24 Mod. L. Rev. 637, 3 U. Malaya L. Rev. 287; Dunbar, "Drafting the
Liquidated Damage Clause-When and How," 20 Ohio St. L.J. 221 (1959); Smith,
"Contractual Controls of Damages in Commercial Transactions," 12 Hastings L.J. 122
(1960); Comments, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 381 (1957), 30 Texas L. Rev. 752 (1952); Note,
1 Adelaide L. Rev. 83 (1960).
One apparent issue is whether the intention of the parties at the time of contracting
determines whether a clause is a penalty or liquidated damages. The decisions constantly
repeat that their intention governs, although occasionally the contrary view is taken,
e.g., Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 481-82, 99 N.W.2d 69, 74 (1959).
Both Professor Corbin and Professor Williston have pointed out that such statements
-cannot be taken literally. 5 Corbin § 1058; 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 788. The Uniform
Commercial Code provisions apparently are not founded on the intention notion;
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(1). The distinction generally makes little difference
since whether the parties intended a penalty or intended to liquidate damages is determined by reference to exactly the same circumstances governing whether the clause
was a reasonable pre-estimate of damages likely to flow from breach. In two situations,
however, it does make a difference. First, a court emphasizing the intention of the
parties finds it logically more difficult to deal with cases where the actual damages
turn out to be far less than anticipated. The intention of the parties would lead to
enforcement of the agreed damages in spite of the change. It is somewhat easier to
permit a second look if the question is the reasonableness of the clause because there
is no particular reason to look only to reasonableness at the time of the contract.
Second, where a clause covers several breaches it may make a difference whether it is
the intention of the parties which is looked to or the reasonableness of the provision.
See discussion in text below.
22 Cal. Civ. Code § 1670 (1960):
Every contract by which the amount of damages to be paid, or other compensation
to be made, for a breach of an obligation, is determined in anticipation thereof,
is to that extent void, except as expressly provided in the next section.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1671 (1960):
The parties to a contract may agree therein upon an amount presumed to be
the amount of damage sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of
the case, it would be impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage.
Similar provisions are: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 13-804, 13-805 (1949); N.D. Rev.
Code § 9-0804 (1943); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 215 (1937); S.D. Code, § 10.0704
(1939). See also Ga. Code Ann. §§ 20-1402, 20-1403 (1935). The Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-718(1) provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
Restatement, Contracts § 339 (1932):
(1) An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the damages therefor, is
not enforceable as a contract and' does not affect the damages recoverable for
the breach, unless
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McCormick, who points out that it is of very limited application in fact,
since in most situations damages cannot be foretold with any exactness.
Moreover, he suggests that in most cases where the rule is applied "it
will usually be found that the amount agreed to be paid was grossly
disproportionate to the actual loss, and it is believed that this is the real
and only justification for refusing sanction to the agreement."23 In
addition others have criticized the doctrine for having several possible
meanings. The doctrine may require
(1) Difficulty of producing proof of damages from a breach after it has
occurred; (2) Difficulty of determining what damages were caused by the
breach; (3) Difficulty of ascertaining what damages were contemplated
when the contract was made; (4) Absence of any standardized measure
of the damages for a certain breach; (5) Difficulty of forecasting, when
the contract is made, all the possible damages24 which may be caused (or
occasioned) by any of the possible breaches.
That the doctrine may have numerous meanings does not necessarily
make it unsound. Indeed, there may be no objection to saying that
the doctrine encompasses all five meanings. In each of the described
situations the remedy provided by the law without assistance from the
parties may give inadequate protection to the promisee's reliance, restitution, and expectancy interests. In such a case power of contract would
be infringed if the parties were not allowed to provide remedies adequate
to those purposes. The myriad meanings are therefore not objectionable
unless one of them were adopted to the exclusion of the others.
Of more interest to the present discussion is Professor McCormick's
objection to the doctrine. He says:
If we reflect that in general the courts enforce promises as parties make
them, and that the only reason for departing from that attitude with
respect to advance agreements about damages is the danger of oppression
from agreements to pay an amount disproportioned to the probable
actual damages, it becomes apparent that the ease or difficulty of predicting what damages a judge or jury would give is of small moment. If the
agreement reasonably approximates the probable damages which a court
would give, why forbid the parties
25 thus to agree, even if the damage could
be readily and exactly foreseen?
But the reason for "departing from that attitude" is not simply the
danger of oppression.2" The reason is that the parties are not free to
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult
of accurate estimation.
See 5 Corbin § 1060; 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 784.
23 McCormick § 148.
24 Patterson, Goble & Jones, Cases on Contracts 813 (4th ed. 1957).
25
26

McCormickA§ 148, at 605.

The oft repeated reference to oppression in penalty cases somehow sounds curiously flat, as it does in the whole history of relief against forfeitures and penalties. For
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make more strict the legal instrument provided by society. They are
not free to change the nature of contract. They may use that almost
infinitely flexible fool, but they may not make it more strict. Thus the
modern tendency of the law toward favoring liquidated damage clauses
in doubtful cases27 is not at odds with the great increase in legislative
and judicial limitation on the power of contract.
Of course, Professor McCormick is far stronger in his further point
that there seems to be no sound objection to the parties' relieving the
judge or jury of the task of fixing damages even where that task would
be an easy one. But this argument, even though it is justifiable criticism
of the uncertainty of the damages requisite, does not raise any substantial
question of infringement of power of contract.
Relation of Amount Fixed to Expected Harm
It is practically undisputed that the damages provided must not be
unreasonably large in relation to the amount of harm which may be
expected from the breach 2 8 An example of such a case has already been
example, Holdsworth says: "It was obviously against conscience that a person should
recover a sum of money wholly in excess of any loss incurred." 5 Holdsworth, History
of the English Law 293 (3d ed. 1945). Except in equity, however, there has never
been any general theory of Anglo-American law that harshness to the defendant or
overreaching by the plaintiff prevents the plaintiff from enforcing his contract. But see
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302; 3 Corbin § 559; Bogert, Britton and Hawkland, cases
on Sales and Security, p. 9 (4th ed. 1962); Stevens, "A Plea for the Extension of Equitable
Principles and Remedies, 41 Cornell L.Q. 351, 366-68 (1956). Why then did the common law
choose to give special treatment to the harshness or overreaching which may be present in a
so-called penalty? The initial answer may be that the law courts practically had to do so
because of the interference of equity. But this only causes the same question to be
asked of equity: Why was the Chancellor so insistent upon relief from forfeitures and
penalties? It was not simply a case of refusing to perform them specifically because
equity restrained the law courts from enforcing them.
One answer to the foregoing questions is that given by Holdsworth:
It was obviously against conscience that a person should recover a sum of money
wholly in excess of any loss incurred. A person seeking to do so might in some
circumstances come perilously near to committing a fraud, and in other circumstances might be unconscientiously seeking to take advantage of an accident.
5 Holdsworth, supra, at 293.
This accounts for individual decisions of equity denying effect to forfeitures and penal
bonds, just as equity refused specifically to enforce promises supported by inadequate
consideration. But it does not account for the development in equity of a general rule
that the recovery on penal bonds was limited to damages actually suffered, except
where "the condition was collateral and no recompense or value could be put on the
breach of it." 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 775A, at 657.
27 5 Willlston (3d ed.) § 788. Moreover, often these limitations of contract are to
prevent the unwise assumption of risks such as those Professor McCormick describes.
McCormick § 147. See also Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302; Notes, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev.
401 (1961), 70 Yale LJ. 453 (1961).
28 See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(1); Restatement, Contracts § 339(1) (a)
(1932); 5 Corbin § 1059; 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 783; but see Lama v. Manale,
218 La. 511, 50 So. 2d 15 (1950), where, pursuant to the Civil Code, the court upheld a
clause providing that a tenant would pay five times the daily rent for each day he held over
in violation of the lease provisions. Conceivably, the agreed damages might exceed greatly
the harm which could be reasonably anticipated at the time of contracting, yet not
exceed the harm which actually occurred. I have seen no case involving precisely this point,
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discussed,2 9 and it was seen that in such a holding there is little or no
substantial infringement of the power of contract. The converse implication of this requisite is that where the damages are not unreasonably
large in relation to the amount of harm which may be expected, the clause
is, unless other doctrine prevents it, enforceable.
Relation of Amount Fixed to Actual Harm

A third requisite of some authorities is a further look before upholding
an agreed remedies clause to determine whether it is reasonable "in
light of the harm actually caused by the breach. '30 There are several
possible approaches to the question of actual losses: (1) Except as
evidence helpful in determining what was reasonable at the time of
contracting, the amount or existence of the actual loss is irrelevant;
(2) the plaintiff does not have to show any loss and need only prove
a stipulated damage clause reasonable at the time of the contract; or
(3) the plaintiff must prove a stipulated damage clause reasonable
at the time of the contract and reasonable in relation to the losses which
actually occurred.
(1) Actual damages irrelevant except as evidence of reasonableness
but see the converse, discussed in the text below, where the actual harm turned out to be
much less than was reasonably anticipated at the time of contracting.
29 See text at p. 4q9 supra.
30 Of course, even if a court does not purport to follow this rule, in assessing whether the
estimated damages were reasonable at the time the contract was made the court will look
at what happened subsequently to help judge what the parties had in mind at the time
of the making of the contract. 5 Corbin § 1063, at 304-05; McCormick § 150, at 609; contra,
Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1933) (Learned Hand, J., dissenting).
It is always necessary for the court to recognize the difference between an agreed damage
clause and alternative contracts, 5 Corbin § 1070; McCormick § 154; 5 Williston (3d ed.)
§ 781, especially if the court looks at actual damages. For example, what is worded as a
bilateral contract to buy and sell land with an agreed damages clause for breach by buyermay well be intended as an option in the buyer to buy. In such a case, the buyer having
had the benefit of his bargain, i.e., the right to purchase for a period of time, it would be
most inappropriate not to require him to pay the agreed damages just because the seller
later sold the land for more to someone else. The close relation between an option and a
bilateral contract to sell land coupled with a deposit by purchaser may be a factor in the
reluctance of courts to require return of such deposits even though the seller subsequently
sells at a higher price. One common practice where it is not always clear whether the clause
is a provision for damages or an alternative contract is an agreement which values certain
property or services. See 5 Corbin § 1069. Even though the language used refers to breach,
the valuation is often intended to be the price paid if one of the parties elects or is forced
by circumstances not to return the property or render the services. See, e.g., Sun Printing
& Publishing Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642 (1902) (agreed value of ship chartered for service
in wartime). This doctrine does not, as may first appear, destroy the rule against enforcing
penalities. No matter how worded, it seems unlikely that the court would hold a valuation
clause to be in the nature of an alternative contract if the contract provides one valuation
for voluntary performance and another valuation to be used if there is no performance.
The courts often use phrases such as "actual damages" very loosely. It thus becomes
difficult to determine whether the court means damages actually caused by the breach which
occurred, or compensatory damages as opposed to in terrorem penalties. It is, for example, not
uncommon to find a court requiring that the amount provided be reasonable in light of
actual damages anticipated at the time of the contract. Where it is not possible to have some
assurance as to which is meant, the case cannot be cited as authority on the question at
hand.
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at time of contracting. There are few cases in which the court enforced
an executory agreed damage clause where it is reasonably clear that the
plaintiff suffered no loss.8 1 The courts in many more cases, however, have
stated that the actual loss was irrelevant, except perhaps as evidence
on the question of reasonableness at the time of contracting. In some
such cases the courts excluded proof that there was no harm, 2 in others
the statement was only dictum. In a great many cases the loss was one
31 McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956), criticized in Comment, 9 Stan.
L. Rev. 381 (1957); Parker-Washington Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 136, 107 N.E. 872
(1915) (it is not completely clear that no harm was done by the breach, but the court seems
to consider the question irrelevant); compare Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351, 359, 134 N.E.2d
329, 333 (1956) where the court quotes apparently with approval, Restatement, Contracts
§ 339 (1932), which requires "a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that
is caused by the breach." There are a few cases, see text below, reaching a result similar
to McCarthy v. Tally, supra, where a defaulter attempted to recover a deposit.
It may be argued that Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(1), supra note 21, is in
accord with McCarthy v. Tally, supra, since it requires reasonableness "in the light of
the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach." But in determining reasonableness the courts are also enjoined to consider "the difficulties of proof of loss, and
the inconvenience or non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy." A clause
reasonable in light of anticipated harm would probably be unreasonable under one or both
of these latter provisions if there clearly is no loss. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 might
also be used to strike down the clause in such a case. See generally 1955 Report of the N.Y.
Law Revision Comm'n, Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 580, 704.
In Schutt Realty Co. v. Mullowney, 215 Minn. 340, 10 N.W.2d 273 (1943), the court
allowed recovery of an agreed $1000 per month for four months delay in performing a
building wrecking contract. After it had entered the wrecking contract, the plaintiff-land
owner agreed to sell the premises to a third party by a certain date and to pay $500 a month
for delay in doing so. There was a five-month delay because of defendants' breach, and in
addition plaintiff spent $480 completing work defendant should have done, bringing actual
damages to $3380. Thus by the time of breach a situation existed in which it is dubious
whether a court would, as an initial proposition, have enforced an agreed damage clause.
Nevertheless, for two reasons the case is not a strong one for the proposition that actual
damages can be ignored. First, the discrepancy between actual damages and those agreed upon
was only about 20% of the former. Second, plaintiff may well have suffered some intangible
and unmeasurable damage to its business reputation by its failure to perform the second
contract.
For additional cases on this point and those mentioned at notes 32-34, 38, 39, 44 and 76
infra; see Annot., 34 A.L.R. 1336 (1925).
32 Among such cases are the following: United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S.
105 (1907) ; Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Stephens v. Essex County
Park Comm'n, 143 Fed. 844 (3d Cir. 1906); Wood v. Niagara Falls Paper Co., 121 Fed.
818 (2d Cir. 1903); Matter of Lion Overall Co., 55 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd.
sub nom. United States v. Walkof, 144 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1944); Byron Jackson Co. v.
United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Blackwood v. Liebke, 87 Ark. 545, 113 S.W.
210 (1908); Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 89 Conn. 51, 92 Atl. 665 (1914); Parker-Washington Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 136, 107 N.E. 872 (1915); Kelso v. Reid, 145 Pa. 606,
23 Atl. 323 (1892); Mead v. Anton, 33 Wash. 2d 741, 207 P.2d 227 (1949). But see Quaile &
Co. v. William Kelly Milling Co., 184 Ark, 717, 43 S.W.2d 369 (1931). Cf. Miller v. MacFarlane, 97 Conn. 299, 116 Atl. 335 (1922) in which buyers of a business who no longer had an
interest therein were not permitted to enforce agreed damages clause in penal bond for breach
of agreement not to compete. The court indicates that if the buyers were still owners the
bond would have been enforceable in full. Compare Miller v. MacFarlane, supra, with later
Connecticut cases which, without discussing the issue in question, recite the requirements of
enforeceability without reference to losses actually incurred, Berger v. Shanahan, 142 Conn.
726, 118 A.2d 311 (1955); King Motors, Inc. v. Delfino, 136 Conn. 496, 72 A.2d 233 (1950).
In Radloff v. Haase, 196 Ill. 365, 63 N.E. 729 (1902), the court held an agreed damage
clause to be a penalty where it was payable upon breach of a covenant not to compete and
where the plaintiff had ceased doing business in the area and had moved to another state.
33 Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v. LeRoy

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 47

which, even with full knowledge of the circumstances, could not be
measured with any degree of accuracy." Thus on their facts most of
these cases hold only that a liquidated damage clause will be given effect
(any other requirements being met) if the actual loss sustained is difficult
to ascertain or difficult or impossible to prove. Effectuating power of
contract requires such a holding, but it does not require holding an agreed
damages clause effective if no loss in fact ensued. The offended party
in such a case requires no help from the law to protect his reliance or
expectancy interests. 5 A case might arise where although there was no
loss, the defaulter was enriched by the default. In such a case power
of contract calls for the enforcement of an agreed damages clause if the
amount of enrichment -cannot easily be ascertained or proved in an
Dyal Co., 186 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1950); Ely v. Wickham, 158 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1946);
Bailey v. Manufacturers' Lumber Co., 224 Fed. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1915); Robbins v. Plant, 174
Ark. 639, 297 S.W. 1027 (1927); Downtown Harvard Lunch Club v. Racso, Inc., 201 Misc.
1087, 107 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. New York County Ct. 1951) ; Learned v. Holbrook, 87 Ore.
576, 170 Pac. 530, rehearing denied, 87 Ore. 589, 171 Pac. 222 (1918).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105 (1907) (failure to deliver
gun carriages on time where the war was nearing its end and "the importance of the
time element largely disappeared"); Frick Co. v. Rubel Corp., 62 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1933)
(delay in accepting delivery of ice machinery, refusal of lower court to allow proof that
"cost of delay was infinitesimally small" compared to penalty upheld); Stephens v. Essex
County Park Comm'n, 143 Fed. 844 (3d Cir. 1906) (delay in constructing subways, shelters,
and lavatories in public parks); Wood v. Niagara Falls Paper Co., 121 Fed. 818 (2d Cir.
1903) (delay in erecting turbines which caused delay in plaintiff's testing or operating its
plant); United States v. J. D. Streett, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 499 (El). Mo. 1957), modified 256
F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1958) (breach of warranty that defendant had not employed any person
'to secure the contract for a contingent fee); Matter of Lion Overall Co., 55 F.
Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd sub. nom. United States v. Walkof, 144 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.
1944) (failure to deliver military uniforms to federal government in late 1940);
Blackwood v. Liebke, 87 Ark. 545, 113 S.W. 210 (1908) (timber sale, breach of agreement
not to leave isolated trees, agreed damages of $1.00 per tree left standing; market price of
trees rose, but no showing whether increase of market price exceeded loss of value because
of isolation of remaining trees); Banta v. Stamford Motor Co., 89 Conn. 51, 92 Atl. 665
(1914) (delay in delivering yacht, buyer lost opportunity to take planned trip); Hackenheimer v. Kutzmann, 235 N.Y. 57, 138 N.E. 735 (1923) (breach of covenant not to injure
good will, amount of harm obviously small but difficult to ascertain); Kelso v. Reid,
145 Pa. 606, 23 Ati. 323 (1892) (breach of convenant not to compete); Mead v. Anton,
33 Wash. 2d 741, 207 P.2d 227 (1949) (breach of covenant not to compete).
In Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., Inc., 190 Misc.
418, 72 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1947) a market existing at the time
of breach did not exist at the time of the contract. How the actual loss could be
hown is not made clear, and the court notes that no suggestion had been made that the
amount in the clause was "disproportionate."
But see Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940) (delay
in delivering pumps to the Soil Conservation Service although the Service was not ready
to use them) and Parker-Washington Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 136, 107 N.E. 872
(1915) in which there was delay in completing a contract to build a pumping station which
was useless until tunnels were built. The contractors building the tunnels were also late.
The court was concerned that all the contractors might make the same argument. The
decision can therefore be justified on the theory that this $50 per day delay clause was
only this contractor's share of the whole slowdown. A similar result on very similar facts
occurred in Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sho-Me Power Corp., 157 F. Supp. 681 (W.D.
Mo. 1957).
35 Professor McCormick takes a contrary view, consistent with his belief that freedom of
contract is involved in every refusal to enforce an agreed damages clause. McCormick
§ 150; but cf. Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 130 (1947).
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action for restitution. In one other common type of case power of contract
would be infringed by refusing to enforce an agreed damages clause.
Suppose that such a clause, while reasonable when entered, is excessive
in light of the actual loss, nevertheless, the amount of the actual loss
is difficult or impossible to prove. 36 In such a case if the plaintiff is
allowed to recover only the losses he can prove, he is not receiving the
adequate protection he tried to provide for himself, and his power
of contract would thereby be infringed. On the other hand, full enforcement alters the nature of the contract instrument by giving him more
than full protection of his reliance and expectancy interests. If such a
case arose, it would be possible to preserve the nature of contract and
still not infringe the plaintiff's power of contract by enforcing the clause

partially, allowing recovery of an amount reasonably related to the
actual loss and giving the plaintiff all the benefits of doubt as to what
the loss was. This problem is closely related to the cases discussed below
concerning the relationship of the clause to all possible breaches, including
ones which did not occur.
Since effectuating power of contract does not require the strict rule of
McCarthy v. Tally,'7 that actual losses are irrelevant (except in ascer-

taining reasonableness at time of contracting), it is not surprising that
a number of courts have refused to enforce clauses where the agreed
damages were excessive in relation to, the actual loss,3 or have stated
36 Hackenheimer v. Kurtzmann, 235 N.Y. 57, 138 N.E. 735 (1923) illustrates the
problem. The amount agreed upon was $50,000, and the breach was interference with
the good will of one of the parties. The interference was relatively minor, but not de
minimis. This problem is not limited to second-look cases. It can also arise where from the
beginning the amount specified is excessive as to any possible loss, yet the exact extent
of the damages is difficult to prove, e.g., $10,000 a week for delay in completion of a
small new church building.
37 46 Cal. 2d 577, 297 P.2d 981 (1956).
38 Rispin v. Midnight Oil Co., 291 Fed. 481 (9th Cir. 1923) (demurrer to answer
alleging that plaintiff had suffered no damages held improperly granted where complaint alleged agreed damage clause and breach of contract to drill test oil well); Northwest Fixture Co. v. Kilbourne & Clark Co., 128 Fed. 256 (9th Cir. 1904); Rowe v.
Shehyn, 192 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1961) (agreement of buyer to pay a deposit in real
estate transaction held unenforceable where seller subsequently sold at price above the
contract price); Matter of Gelino's, Inc., 43 F.2d 832 (E.D. Ill. 1930); The Columbia, 197
Fed. 661 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Rasmussen v. Home Indus. Iron Works, 199 Fed. 990
(5th Cir. 1912) (delay in repairing ship; demurrage clause unenforceable where the
ship would be idle even if repairs completed on time); Marshall v. Patzman, 81 Ariz.
367, 306 P.2d 287 (1957); Quaile & Co. v. William Kelly Milling Co., 184 Ark. 717, 43
S.W.2d 369 (1931); Miller v. MacFarlane, 97 Conn. 299, 116 At. 335 (1922) (see note
32 supra); Radoff v. Haase, 196 Ill. 365, 63 N.E. 729 (1902) (see note 32 supra); Independent School Dist. v. Dudley, 195 Iowa 398, 192 N.W. 261 (1923) (breach of contract by school teacher two months before school was to start); Gorco Constr. Co. v.
Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 99 N.W.2d 69 (1959); J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Fronk,
105 Minn. 39, 117 N.W. 229 (1908); Ward v. Haren, 183 Mo. App. 569, 167 S.W. 1064
(1914); Fahn v. Dann, 207 Misc, 834, 140 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1955) (clause providing 50% of contract price as liquidated damages held not enforceable
where plaintiff made no allegation of actual damage); Jones v. Kelley, 91 S.W.2d 969
(Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952); Hathaway
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that enforcement would be denied.3 9 Some of these cases reflect a
general hostility, less prevalent than it once was,4" to liquidated damage
clauses and on their facts some of these cases give inadequate protection
to plaintiff's need to improve on the legal remedy otherwise available
to him. Such decisions are an infringement of the plaintiff's power of
contract. As explained above, however, the theory upon which the
cases proceed is not.
(2) Plaintiff does not have to show any loss. The second possible
theory is that the agreed damage clause (if otherwise valid) shifts to
the defendant the burden of showing that the agreed damages are unreasonable in light of actual losses. Often the defendant will be unable
to make any such showing because of the nature of the damages, thus
leaving the plaintiff fully protected by the clause. This theory is consistent with the result although not the rationalization of many of
the cases refusing to look to the actual damages in determining the
validity of the clause. 41 Most of the cases sanctioning the examination
of actual damages to determine whether the agreed damages are excessive also are not inconsistent with this theory.42 In those cases where the
defendant is successful in showing a disparity, the plaintiff's power of
contract is not necessarily infringed by failure to enforce the clause.4
(3) Plaintiff must prove that the agreed damage clause is reasonable
in terms of actual losses. This doctrine may have been adopted by a
v. Lynn, 75 Wis. 186, 43 N.W. 956 (1889); see cases cited infra notes 77-78 allowing
recovery of deposits. And see Restatement, Contracts § 339, comment e (1932). Contra, see
cases cited supra note 32; cf. Parker-Washington Co. v. City of Chicago, 267 Ill. 136, 107
N.E. 872 (1915); Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484 (1952); Andreasen v.
Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959). See also cases cited supra note 33.
39 Langoma Lumber Corp. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1955), aff'd,
232 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1956); Owen v. Christopher, 144 Kan. 765, 771, 62 P.2d 860, 864
(1936) ("if there are no damages suffered, the full amount could not be recovered.");
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Jones, 256 Ky. 181, 75 S.W.2d 1057 (1934) (subsequent language
in the opinion casts some doubt on this dictum); A-Z Servicenter, Inc. v. Segall, 334
Mass. 672, 138 N.E.2d 266 (1956); Sonken-Galambra Corp. v. Abels, 185 Okla. 645, 95
P.2d 601 (1939) (in syllabus by court); Collier v. Betterton, 87 Tex. 440, 29 S.W. 467
(1895); but see Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484 (1952).
40 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 788.
41 See notes 31-34, supra. See generally 5 Corbin §§ 1062-63. A large number of cases
state that the plaintiff need not plead or prove actual damages in order to recover the full
amount of the liquidated damages. See, e.g., United States v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 152
F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Shipley v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R.R., 83 F. Supp. 722,
748 (W.D. Pa. 1949); Frank Towers Corp. v. Laviana, 140 Conn. 45, 97 A.2d 567 (1953)
(attempt to recover deposit); Smith v. Lane, 236 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
For a collection of older cases see Annot., 34 A.L.R. 1336 (1925). These statements are
not very enlightening out of context since they occur in cases involving a variety of
situations. In some situations the existence of actual damages is self-evident, even though
in many of these it would be very difficult to prove the amount of those damages; in
some the court held the clause to be a penalty on other grounds and in some the court
apparently means that even if proved actual damages would be irrelevant.
42 See notes 38-39, supra; but see the cases cited in text in next paragraph below.
43 For a more complete discussion of this point see pp. 504 et. seq. supra.
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few courts.44 Such a requirement in any case where the amount of
the actual damage is difficult or impossible to prove destroys the protection the parties sought to give the plaintiff. Yet it is in these very
situations that the sanctions of the law are inadequate to protect the
plaintiff, and that failure to enforce the agreed damage clause is an
infringement of the power of contract. The relatively few cases
reaching this result are probably more an expression of an older attitude
of hostility toward agreed damage clauses or toward a particular clause
than expressions of a considered view of how to handle valid agreed
damages clauses in court. Since the trend seems to be toward favoring
such clauses45 and since the results under this theory constitute an
infringement of the power of contract, it may be that these few cases
(which are not overly clear on the point) are of little use in predicting
modern decisions.
Single Amount for Varying Breaches
A fourth problem of enforceability involves the clause providing for
a single sum as agreed damages which would be operable in a variety
of types of breaches. Three views have been expressed. Where an agreed
damages clause provides the same amount of damages for breaches
of varying importance (1) it is unenforceable; 4 (2) it is unenforceable
if it would be unenforceable as to any of the breaches to which it
applies; 41 (3) it is enforceable if the clause is otherwise enforceable as
48
to the breach which actually occurred.
(1) Clause unenforceable if applicable to breaches of varying importance. If applied strictly, this rule would destroy practically all
agreed damage clauses. Since it is almost impossible to foresee all the
44 It is not always possible to tell whether the court intended to reach such a result, but
in the following cases the court may have done so. In some of the cases the burden of
proof probably did not affect the result. Northwest Fixture Co. v. Kilbourne & Clark Co.,
128 Fed. 256 (9th Cir. 1904); Independent School Dist. v. Dudley, 195 Iowa 398, 192
N.W. 261 (1923); Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 99 N.W.2d 69 (1959); J.I.
Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Fronk, 105 Minn. 39, 117 N.W. 229 (1908); Ward v. Haren,
183 Mo. App. 569, 167 S.W. 1064 (1914) (plaintiff need only show breach and some
substantial damage; then the amount is determined by the clause); Hathaway v. Lynn,
75 Wis. 186, 43 N.W. 956 (1889) (apparently the plaintiff has only the burden of showing
a "substantial breach" through the showing of some loss by the breach).
In Caplan v. Schroeder, 56 Cal. 2d 515, 364 P.2d 321 (1961) recovery of a down payment
was sought by a breaching purchaser. The court held that since defendants failed to defend in the trial court on the ground that the clause permitting retention of the payment
was an agreement to liquidate damages, the retention could not be upheld on that ground,
even though by the standards of prior California cases the clause was enforceable. One
cannot help but think that the court was influenced by the subsequent sale by the
owners at a price higher than the contract price.
45 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 788.
46 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 783, at 726.
47 5 Corbin § 1066.

48 Id. at 322.
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ways in which a given breach can occur and the consequences of every
breach, it is also almost impossible to draft a liquidated damage clause
which would be reasonable in every conceivable breach. 49 An illustration
of this is a lump sum amount for breach of a covenant not to compete
for a number of years. Such clauses have been upheld in many cases.5 0
Yet a lump sum which is reasonable for a breach throughout most of the
period always becomes unreasonable at some stage toward the end of the
period." The courts try to avoid this problem with the doctrine by
such methods as holding the clause applicable only to substantial
breaches. 2 But in many cases where a clause is upheld, it requires little
imagination to think of breaches which could have occurred and which
would have caused more or less harm to the plaintiff than the one which
did occur.
This doctrine is based largely on the intention-of-the-parties theory.
[Ilt is impossible to show in such a case that the parties made an honest
attempt to estimate the actual injury which would be caused, since no
reasonable person would suppose that the injury from any breach
which
53
might occur would involve the same damage as any other breach.
The quoted words give a clue as to how the courts limit what would
otherwise be an all-destructive doctrine. The less obvious it is that
the clause applies to a variety of breaches of varying importance, the
more likely it is that the court will enforce the clause in a breach where
it otherwise would be enforceable. In these cases it is easiest to find an
intention of the parties to pre-estimate actual losses.
It should be pointed out that the parties may act reasonably and with
no intention of imposing a penalty even though the same amount does
apply to a variety of breaches of varying importance. If the amount is
reasonable as to the slightest of these breaches, the agreed damages
are doubtless too low for more serious breaches. Thus the intention of
the parties as to the serious breaches is to limit liability, not to preestimate them, which is not the same as an attempt to assess a penalty.
49 In Hackenheimer v. Kurtzmann, 235 N.Y. 57, 138 N.E. 735 (1923), the court limited
the broad language of the clause to avoid the "other breaches" doctrine as laid down in
Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920). judge Andrews said: "Seidlitz
v. Auerbach may be pressed to so extreme a conclusion as to make it impossible to draw
any contract providing for such damages." 235 N.Y. at 67, 138 N.E. at 739.
50 5 Corbin § 1071.
51 See Management, Inc. v. Schassberger, 39 Wash. 2d 321, 235 P.2d 293 (1951),
where the court recognizes this problem. The lump sum in that case was probably unreasonable as to any breach, including the one which actually occurred. But the court's
language casts doubt on the validity of any lump sum damage clause in such cases.
52 See, e.g., Hathaway v. Lynn, 75 Wis. 186, 43 N.W. 956 (1889); Ward v. Haren, 183
Mo. App. 569, 167 S.W. 1064 (1914).
53 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 783, at 727. See also McCormick § 151, at 611.
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There is no general policy of contract law against limiting liability.5 4
In addition to the foregoing criticisms of this doctrine, its operation
can be a serious infringement of the power of contract. Quite a few
cases have not followed this rule strictly and have allowed recovery
under an agreed damages clause applicable to a variety of breaches
of varying importance where it was reasonable as to all of them.5"
(2) Clause unenforceable if it would be unenforceable as to any of
the breaches to which it applies. In determining to which breaches it
applies, this doctrine meets the same problems as the first rule. It too
is based on the intention theory, namely that if the parties have specified
the same amount of damages for breaches of varying importance, they
have not made a genuine effort to pre-estimate actual losses. 56 And in
addition it can be said that in one or more of the possible applications
the parties have intended to provide for a penalty, to change the nature
of the contractual tool supplied by society. For these reasons a large
number of courts have refused to enforce agreed damage clauses which
were rather obviously applicable to some breaches where the clause
would have been unreasonable.5"
(3) Clause enforceable if otherwise enforceable as to breach which
actually occurred. The application of either of the foregoing rules constitutes serious infringements of the power of contract whenever the
54 See Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959); 5 Williston (3d ed.),
§ 781A; 5 Corbin § 1068. This point is discussed extensively in an excellent article, Fritz,
"'Underliquidated' Damages as Limitation of Liability," 33 Texas L. Rev. 196 (1954). But
see Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718, comment 1, and § 2-719, comment 1. Of course,
underliquidating damages or otherwise limiting liability just as providing for penalties is
an alteration of the social tool of contract. There is, however, an important difference. V10
A party is free to contract or not to contract. When he contracts, but limits liability,
he is altering the nature of the social tool of contract in the direction of his right not to
contract at all. He is thus merely adding flexibility to the tool. In cases where a party
is not free to refuse to enter the contract or where society imposes some noncontractual
duty, e.g., tort liability, then of course the foregoing point does not apply. Even so, a
court may give effect to contracts exculpating a party from noncontractual duties. See,
e.g., Ciafalo v. Tic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962
(1961); Sutton, "Contractual Exemptions from Liability," 34 Austl. L.J. (pts. 1-2) 290, 311
(1961).
It is doubtless true that limitations on liability are especially prevalent in contracts of
adhesion or other unbalanced agreements. But the problems thereby created should not
prevent the use of "weak" contracts where the objections of adhesion or unbalance are
not present.
Although a party has a right not to contract, he does not have any comparable rights
lying on the stricter side of contract. He cannot for breach of agreement lawfully imprison people or take their money or detain their children, etc. His attempt to assess a
penalty is an attempt to exercise a power other than the power of contract by pushing
contract farther in that direction than society has decided it should go.
55 See 5 Corbin § 1066, at 322 & n.84 (citing cases).
56 5 Corbin § 1066, at 318.
57 Ibid.; McCormick § 151, at 611; 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 783, at 726. In some of the
cases the clause was doubtless also unenforceable because it was unreasonable as to the
breach which occurred, or, indeed as to any conceivable breach. See, e.g., Management, Inc.
v. Schassberger, 39 Wash. 2d 321, 235 P.2d 293 (1951).
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breach which actually occurred is one for which legal remedies are not
fully adequate in protecting the promisee's reliance, restitution, and
expectancy interests. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the
doctrine has been criticized by two prominent scholars.
Professor Corbin says:
A case may, indeed, arise in which the amount specified in the contract
is a reasonable forecast and estimate of the injury caused by the breach
that has actually occurred, even though it would not be so in the case of
other breaches that might have occurred. If the contract provision has
this actual operation in the case before the court and the extent of injury
is difficult of estimation, there is nothing to prevent the enforcement of
the express provision.55
Professor McCormick is in accord:
In the situation supposed, the defendant has admittedly agreed explicitly
to pay the sum sued for in the event of the breach which has occurred,
and admittedly the sum sued for is a reasonable one. The defendant should
not be given the loophole of escape that, if he had committed a different
breach, the sum named would not have been reasonable.6 9
Unfortunately, neither cites any cases to support his position, and I have
found little case authority explicitly adopting their viewpoint,6 0 but
there is a good deal of indirect support for their views. As suggested
before, this question lurks and is ignored in almost every case involving
an agreed damages clause. Nevertheless, countless decisions enforcing
such clauses come down each year. Moreover, the~cases refusing to look
at actual damages 6' are analogous support, since the courts so holding
are in effect denying full concern with the extent of the breach which
actually occurred, focusing attention only on the one occurring as
anticipated by the parties. If a court refuses to be fully concerned
with the breach which in fact occurred, there is little justification for it
concerning itself with hypothetical breaches. Further indirect support
is to be found in at least one case which involved two agreed damage
clauses, one providing for $40 per acre for harm to growing crops if a
levee failed, the other providing $40 per acre for general violation of a
covenant to maintain the levee. The court held the former invalid since
58 5 Corbin § 1066, at 322.
59 McCormick, § 151, at 612.
60 In Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1919) the court states:
If it were not for the earnestness with which this claim is presented we should
content ourselves with the observation that as there was delay in the completion of
both buildings, the case falls literally within the terms of the contract of the parties
and that a court will refuse to imagine a different state of facts than that before it
for the purpose of obtaining a basis for modifying a written agreement. .....
At best this is an alternative holding, perhaps only a dictum. A recent English case
supports the position of Professors Corbin and McCormick. Phonographic Equipment
(1958) Ltd. v. Muslu, [1961] Weekly L.R. 1379 (C.A.); 1962 J. Bus. Law 69.
61 See notes 31-34 supra.
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damages to extant crops were easily ascertainable, but it enforced the
second. 2 It can be argued that such a case is authority for the views
expressed by Professors Corbin and McCormick. The law should not
turn on whether the parties used one clause to cover different breaches
for some of which it was ineffective or whether the parties divided the
clause into two clauses, one of which was unenforceable.
The Uniform Commercial Code is in accord with the views of Professors Corbin and McCormick. Although the Code does not mention
this problem explicitly, it defines enforceability in terms of reasonableness
in "light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach,"
(emphasis added) and other factors not relevant here. There is thus
no room in the statutory formula for using the unfortunate "other
breach" rule to invalidate otherwise valid agreed damage clauses.
An examination of the law concerning liquidated damages and penalty
clauses leads to the conclusion that most of the judicial doctrine and
even more of the judicial holdings are consistent with the power of
contract as herein defined. That is to say, the courts tend to hold that
agreed damage clauses are enforceable when the law does not otherwise
give adequate protection to the reliance, restitution and expectancy,
interests. And the courts tend to hold that agreed damage clauses are
unenforceable penalty clauses when they do more than try to give
adequate protection to these interests.
PENAL BONDS

Another executory device to fix damages is the penal bond. In spite
of their language penal bonds are often devices by which a party to a
contract is protected by the credit of a third party against the failure
of the other contractor to perform. The amount specified is not an
attempt to fix damages, but a limitation on the liability of the third
party, and the bond is enforceable only to the amount of damages
proven, subject to the limit of the amount specified. 4 Penal bonds,
however, are also sometimes used to fix damages for breach or for
failure of an event to occur. 65 The latter type raises questions concerning power of contract.
62 Seid Pak Sing v. Barker, 197 Cal. 321, 240 Pac. 765 (1925), cited McCormick § 151, at
612.
13 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(1), the text of which appears in n.22, supra.
64 5 Corbin § 1056, at 268-272. Unlike penalty clauses in contracts, the limitation of
liability is effective even though the bond is not a successful attempt to liquidate damages.
Id. at 276.
65 A distinction was taken . . . between bonds 'where the party might be put in as
good a plight as where the condition itself was literally performed' and cases 'where the
condition was collateral and no recompense or value could be put on the breach of it.'
In the former case equity would give relief; in the latter case it would not; and this
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A common example of penal bonds intended to fix damages are
those given to public bodies or officials to secure performance of a
statutory duty.66 The courts enforce these with no showing of pecuniary
damages, thus giving them the same effect as a valid agreed damage
clause in a contract.' It is interesting to note that where such bonds
are required, the public body or official could seldom, if ever, show
the amount of damage for failure of the conditioned event to occur.
Thus, even though these are statutory bonds, the public body in fact
receives only the same protection which the effectuation of the power
of contract would make available to a private contractor. A few cases
have reached the same result where a bond was given to a private
person. 68
When the amount of a penal bond is excessive in relation to anticipated or actual damages, there is no substantial infringement of the
power of contract in refusing to enforce it, even though the parties
intended it to be enforced, if the law provides sanctions adequate to
protect the interests of the obligee of the bond. Just as in the case
of other executory agreed damage clauses the courts seem, in the few
cases which have arisen, to give effect to such bonds as liquidating
damages where the sanctions of the law would otherwise be inadequate.69 Unlike other executory agreed damage clauses it is difficult
to say whether the opposite result would be reached where the sanctions
otherwise available are adequate, because most private penal bonds
are not treated as attempts to fix damages, in spite of clear language
making the face amount of the bond payable unless the condition occurs.
This language may be meant literally by the parties, in which case
failure to enforce would contravene their ihtention. Usually, however,
there is no way to tell whether or not they meant the language to be
taken literally.70 On the whole the penal bond cases in which the
intention of the parties is ascertainable appear not to infringe the
power of contract.
distinction has developed into the modern distinction between penalties and liquidated
damages.
5 Williston (3d ed.) § 775A, at 657.
66 5 Corbin § 1056, at 273; 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 775B, at 661.
67 In United States v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 152 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) the
court discussed the problem in terms very similar to those it might have used in dealing
with any other type of liquidated damage clause.
68 5 Corbin § 1056, at 274; McCormick § 147, at 602.
69 5 Corbin § 1056, at 274; McCormick § 147, at 602.
70 But see Miller v. MacFarlane, 97 Conn. 299, 116 Atl. 335 (1922) where a penal bond
conditioned on defendant's agreement not to compete was held to be intended to be a
liquidation of damages. Plaintiff was not allowed to enforce it, because if it were applicable
where plaintiff no longer had an interest in the business, it would constitute a penalty.
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FORFEITURES

The prior sections dealt with agreed damage clauses and penal bonds
requiring the intervention of the court to be effective. This section deals
with agreed remedies clauses where the party attacking the clause is
seeking return of something he has given to the party defending the
clause. There is a close relation between the two types of clauses and
the courts often fail to distinguish them. Any case preventing a forfeiture of an amount paid or value given pursuant to an agreement
providing for forfeiture is a fortiori authority for refusing to enforce an
executory agreed damages clause in the same circumstances. Refusal
to prevent the forfeiture, however, is not necessarily authority for
enforcement of an executory clause in the same circumstances. The
forfeiture cases involve the conceptual barriers facing plaintiffs-indefault,71 problems not present in the executory cases.
Forfeitures, just as executory agreed damage clauses, may be intended as alternative contracts.7 2 For example, providing for forfeiture
of a deposit in a bilateral buy and sell agreement may be intended to
give the buyer an option to buy or, in return for having the right to
do so for a period of time, to forfeit the deposit. In such a case the
fact that the seller sells for a higher price should not give the buyer
power to recover his deposit, since that is the cost of his "option."
Recovery of the deposit in such a case would infringe the power of
contract.
Forfeitures, just as executory agreed damage clauses, may clearly be
intended to fix damages. Unlike executory agreed damage clauses, however, forfeiture clauses may, and often do, have another purpose. The
provision, the breach of which may lead to a forfeiture, is not solely
for measuring damages. The provision may appear to have nothing to
do with breach, but rather it may be a part of the working arrangement of the parties. For example, if a service contract provides that
payment is to be made at the end of each month, that is part of the
arrangement between the parties which in most cases will have nothing
to do with a breach. Nevertheless, if the one rendering the service
breaches during a month, the situation created by the clause may create
a forfeiture, and a court may be asked to prevent it.
A court may be asked to prevent a forfeiture in two basic situations.
First, a forfeiture may occur by virtue of operation of the contract
where the contract says nothing about it. Second, the parties may
71 See generally authorities collected in Wade, Cases on Restitution 472-507
Dawson & Palmer, Cases on Restitution 417-59 (1958).
72 See, e.g., Smith v. Chandler, 199 Ore. 607, 263 P.2d 764 (1953).

(1958);
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expressly agree ahead of time that in the event of breach the forfeiture
shall inure to the benefit of the innocent party. The two tend to
merge. For example, suppose an employee promises to work for a
month and the employer promises to pay him $1000 at the end of the
month. If the employee quits after two weeks, we have a rather clear
example of the first situation. And yet if the clause concerning payment
is more closely conditioned upon performance it is evident that the
parties have come very close to agreeing ahead of time that there
would be a forfeiture in event of breach. Nevertheless, they were also
arranging the time of payment, a part of the substance of the arrangement itself rather than merely providing for damages upon breach. In
such cases, however, the damage aspect is an important one, and the
provision is not far different from an express provision for forfeiture.
When the parties do not specify what is to happen if there is a
breach by which the innocent party is enriched, effectuation of the
power of contract calls for protection of the innocent party's reliance,
restitution, and expectancy interests. If the forfeiture exceeds those
amounts, requiring the innocent party to return the excess by which
he is enriched does not strip him of adequate protection of the interests
which we have encompassed in power of contract, even though the
provisions as to the forfeiture are quite explicit. Nevertheless, if the
innocent party has to return more than the excess, he does not receive
that protection, and there is a curtailment of his power of contract.
As suggested earlier in another context, this curtailment is perhaps not
a very serious one if the innocent party can explicitly provide in the
contract for a forfeiture adequate to protect his reliance, restitution,
and expectancy interests. But if, where he has so provided, the court
prevents the forfeiture in such a way as to leave these interests inadequately protected, then there is a serious curtailment of the power
of contract.
This article is not the appropriate place to add to the volume of
literature concerning the plaintiff in default. Instead focus will be on
those cases where the forfeiture was clearly intended to fix damages.
Here it is evident that the parties were thinking of a post-breach
73
situation as well perhaps as the normal fulfillment of the contract.
73 No attempt will be made to carry out the difficult task of ascertaining what the effect
is of an explicit forfeiture provision as compared to a forfeiture implicit in the situation
created by the terms of the contract. Does an explicit provision help or hinder the one
claiming that the forfeiture should not be set aside? See 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 791, at
771-72. As the discussion in the text below indicates, whether the forfeiture is created explicitly or implicitly the same principles should govern, but as has been said: "The significance of a forfeiture clause is difficult to evaluate." Dawson & Palmer, Cases on Restitution 430 (1958).
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Not surprisingly, the decisions dealing with forfeitures very closely
parallel those dealing with executory damage clauses. By and large
explicit forfeiture provisions are given effect only where the law does
not provide fully adequate protection to the innocent party's reliance,
restitution and expectancy interests. However, the reluctance of courts
to allow a plaintiff in default to recover sometimes gives an innocent
party greater protection when the defaulter is trying to recover from
him than where an innocent party is trying to recover from the defaulter
under an executory agreed damage clause. 74 This reluctance seems to
be the least where the situation in which a forfeiture could occur was
most clearly created for the purpose of fixing damages. The reluctance
is greatest where the forfeiture occurred simply through performance
of the contract with a forfeiture provision superimposed.
One of the clearest examples of a forfeiture provision intended to
fix damages is a deposit required as protection against the depositor's
default. Often the problem is analyzed by the court just as if it were
dealing with an executory agreed damages clause, 75 and applying the
76
same principles.
See especially the installment sales cases, infra, notes 81 et seq.
See, e.g., Barnette v. Sayers, 289 Fed. 567 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Cf. Rowe v. Shehyn,
192 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1961); McCann v. City of Albany, 158 N.Y. 634, 53 N.E. 673
(1899); Zucht v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 207 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Nelson
v. Richardson, 299 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). The Florida courts, however, purport
to draw a clear line between the executory clause and deposits, at least in real estate
contracts. Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1950); Pembroke v. Caudill, 160 Fla.
948, 37 So. 2d 538 (1948); but see Florida cases cited at note 76 infra.
76 Restatement, Contracts § 340 (1932); McCormick § 153; 5 Williston (3d ed.) §
790; for a collection of cases see 6 A.L.R.2d 1401 (1949).
Such an agreement will be held to provide a penalty instead of being a liquidation of
damages under the same circumstances and for the same reasons as in the case of executory promises to pay a fixed sum of money. A penalty will not be enforced merely
because it is in the form of a deposit.
5 Corbin § 1074, at 347.
Possible exceptions are the cases dealing with deposits required with bids on public
contracts as security that the successful bidder will execute the contract. The courts
usually refuse to allow recovery of such deposits. 5 Corbin § 1974, at 349. This refusal
can be explained as being simply legislative policy, contra to the policy usual in private
contracts. Dunbar, "Drafting the Liquidated Damage Clause-When and How," 20 Ohio
St. L.J. 221, 227 (1959). The decisions, however, are not necessarily contra to the
policies governing private contracts. As a party to a continual flow of contracts a public
body suffers a serious injury, the exact amount of which is unascertainable, if its sealed
bidding system is undermined by practices such as withdrawing bids after receipt and
opening but before acceptance. See Gantt, "Selected Government Contract Problems,"
14 Fed. BJ. 388, 400-01 (1954). This of course is precisely the type of situation in -which
reasonable agreed damage clauses are enforced.
Supplementing the cases involving executory clauses cited at notes 30-33 supra, the
following cases should be noted as holding or stating that actual damages do not determine the validity of the deposit provision; Broderick Wood Prods. Co. v. United States,
195 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Barnette v. Sayers, 289 Fed. 567 (D.D.C. Cir. 19231; Zucht
v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 207 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); Nelson v. Richardson,
299 S.W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); cf. Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 670, 245 S.W.2d
484, 486 (1952); comment, 30 Texas L. Rev. 752 (1952).
In Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920), a case involving a forfeiture,
the court said that "in determining whether the amount of the deposit is to be treated as
74
75
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Often a contract permits a party to withhold part of the price
until completion of the contract and specifies that the withheld portion
will not be paid if there is no completion. Such a provision has substantial importance for purposes other than fixing damages. It provides
security for the withholder for whatever is due from the other party,
and it is an allocation of the costs of credit and working capital. But
the provision also fixes damages. A large number of cases have permitted recovery of the balance of the price (less damages) by a deliquidated damages or as a penalty the agreement is to be interpreted as of its date, not
as of its breach." Id. at 172, 129 N.E. at 462. The question in the case, however, was
whether the clause applied to breaches which would have caused only minor losses and
ff so whether it was therefore a penalty even though the breach which in fact occurred
was substantial. In J. Weinstein & Sons, Inc. v. City of New York, 264 App. Div. 398, 35
N.Y.S.2d 530 (1st, Dep't 1942), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 741, 46 N.E.2d 351 (1942) the appellate
division opinion pays a great deal of attention to actual damages, although its language
can be interpreted as being concerned only with the intention of the parties at the time
of the contract. See also Fahn v. Dann, 207 Misc. 834, 140 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1955) (discussed supra note 38).
The following cases have held or stated that actual damages were to be considered in
determining whether or not the forfeiture could be recovered: Massman Constr. Co. v.
City Council, 147 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1945) (portions of contract price withheld for delay
in contract to- build bridge; bridge would have been unusable during period of delay
because road on other side of river was not completed) ; Bedford v. J. Henry Miller, Inc.,
212 Fed. 368 (4th Cir. 1914) (portion of contract price withheld for delay in performance
by subcontractor where prime contractor was subject to same damage clause for delay
on prime contract with the government, but government had released prime contractor
from liability thereunder); Marshall v. Patzman, 81 Ariz. 367, 306 P.2d 287 (1957), Patzman v. Marshall, 90 Ariz. 1, 363 P.2d 599 (1961); Abrams v. St. Louis Library Dist. Bd.,
364 Mo. 25, 258 S.W.2d 672 (1953); cf., Plymouth Security v. Johnson, 335 S.W.2d 142
(Mo. 1960).
In Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1950) the court distinguished prior Florida
cases dealing with executory clauses and refused to allow recovery of a deposit by the
breacher of a real estate contract, apparently without consideration of actual damages.
In Paradis v. Second Ave. Used Car Co., 61 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1952) the court in a deposit
case put the burden of proving damages on the bne holding the deposit, citing Pembroke
v. Caudill, 160 Fla. 948, 37 So. 2d 538 (1948) which had been distinguished in Beatty v.
Flannery, supra. In North Beach Invs., Inc. v. Sheikewitz, 63 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1953) a case
involving a deposit, the court sitting en banc did consider actual damages in an opinion
concurred in by three members of the court; two members of the court apparently
thought the actual damages irrelevant. In Haas v. Crisp Realty Co., 65 So. 2d 765 (Fla.
1953) the court held that a forfeiture of over $6000 on a purchase of real estate for
$15,550 was a penalty and refused to affirm a judgment that it was liquidated damages.
The court, noting the rule of Beatty v. Flannery, supra, remanded for a finding whether,
under all the circumstances the forfeiture came within the "unjust enrichment" exception
thereto and thus shocked the conscience of the chancellor. In Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d
393 (Fla. 1954) the court sitting en banc, two judges dissenting, in upholding forfeiture
of a deposit under a lease, discussed the forfeiture clause in the same manner as if it were
executory. The court said that the time of the contract determines whether the clause is
a penalty, but it went on to say that even though originally an enforceable clause the
court might relieve from the forfeiture if it became oppressive. In Lewis v. Belknap, 96
So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1957) the court followed Hyman v. Cohen distinguishing executory from
executed clauses. The latest word from Florida appears to be O'Neill v. Broadview, Inc.,
112 So. 2d 280 (Fla. App. 1959) where the court upheld forfeiture of a $1,500 deposit
on a $10,440 house with an express finding that the amount "is not sufficient to shock the
conscience of the chancellor."
The confused picture presented by the Florida courts is directly traceable to a failure
to recognize overtly that the policy problems are substantially the same whether the
damage clause is executed or executory. Nevertheless the actual results of the Florida
cases are largely consistent with a recognition of that similarity.
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faulting contractor, although there are some cases to the contrary.
One problem often occurring in such cases is that the amount of forfeiture is in inverse proportion to the seriousness of the breach, i.e.,
the closer the one whose pay is being withheld comes to fully performing, the more that is withheld. Thus even though at the point breach
occurs the amount withheld meets all other requisites of an enforceable
agreed damages clause, the forfeiture runs afoul of the rule requiring
agreed damages clauses to be reasonable as to all breaches to which
78
they are applicable.
With respect to a closely related problem, the security arrangement,
the applicable law effectuates power of contract. It is neither necessary nor possible to explore here the details of the rights of redemption
of mortgagors.7 9 It is clear enough, however, that these rights accomplish the following result: They prevent the parties from agreeing to
a security arrangement whereby the creditor upon breach will receive
more than the amount necessary to protect his reliance in making the
loan and his expectancy of being repaid with interest. The creditor is
also able to strip the debtor of any enrichment created by debtor's
default. But the rights of redemption prevent the creditor's securing
more than this, even though the parties agreed that he could. The
power of contract is not infringed since the law gives the creditor fully
adequate protection of his contract interests.
The decisions in both the deposit and withholding of price cases and
in security arrangements seldom infringe the power of contract as
used in this article or do more than uphold the parties' power of
contract. Many of the decisions regarding installment contracts, however, go much further than is necessary to uphold the parties' power
of contract.
In installment sales of both land and chattels8" it is very common
to provide that title remains in the seller until all installments are paid,
and further, that if all the installments are not paid, those already
paid shall be forfeited. The provision retaining title in the seller can
be fully explained as a security device, but the forfeiture clause can
77 5 Corbin § 1073; 5 Williston (3d ed.) § 783, at 728; for a collection of cases see 31
A.L.R.2d 8 (1953).
78 See discussion in text accompanying notes 46-63 supra.
79 For a brief consideration see 3 Williston (rev. ed.) § 771.
80 The distinction between a deposit and a down payment in an installment sale may
sometimes be excruciatingly difficult to determine, as the New York courts, which unfortunately made much turn on the question, discovered. See Corman, "Restitution for
Benefits Conferred by Party in Default Under Sales Contract," 34 Texas L. Rev. 582. 594
(1956) and New York cases cited therein. Happily, N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145-a, protecting
defaulting buyers of goods who do not take possession, eliminates the importance of the
distinction in a great many cases.
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only be explained as an attempt to fix damages, superimposed on the
situation created by the security arrangement. Despite the very close
relation between mortgages and other forfeiture cases and this type
of arrangement, a great many decisions have refused to allow the defaulter to recover. 81
Not all these decisions necessarily overextend the power of contract since in many cases the forfeiture may meet all the requisites of
an enforceable agreed damages clause. For example, in retail installment
sales the seller retaking the goods upon default probably rarely has any
net gain.

82

In some of the decisions, however, if the court had been dealing
with an executory agreed damages clause instead of an attempt to
prevent a forfeiture, the clause would probably not have been enforced.83 These decisions go further than the power of contract requires
and permit the parties to make the contract tool more strict than the
reliance, restitution, and expectancy interests of the wronged party
require. It is not surprising that these decisions have received much
criticism84 and that there is some strong dissent.88 Since many courts

have failed to recognize and to cope with such perversions of contract,
extensive legislation attempting to correct the situation has been enacted.8 6 To the extent that it is applicable this legislation brings the
law governing many installment sales into line with the definition of
power of contract suggested herein.,
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

One of the most interesting questions of power of contract concerns
the right of a party to a contract to have specific performance. It
81 5 Corbin §§ 1074, 1129, 1132, 1133, 1134; McCormick § 153; 5 Williston (3d ed.)
§ 791.
82 See Hogan, "A Survey of State Retail Instalment Sales Legislation," 44 Cornell L.Q.
38 (1958). See also McCormick, § 153, at 616. Of course, that the seller buys the goods
or land at the foreclosure or other statutory sale for the amount paid in or less, does not
necessarily mean he is not enriched. "[Plublic sale produces only a relatively small portion
of the true market value of the auctioned item and is subject to all the economic factors
affecting any forced sale." Corman, supra note 80, at 601.
83 See, e.g., Moore v. Mosher, 88 Cal. App. 2d 324, 198 P.2d 714 (1948) ($1300 down
payment on purchase of dress shop, total price, $2300).
84 See, e.g., 5 Corbin §§ 1074, 1129, 1132-1134; McCormick § 153; 5 Williston (3d ed.)
§ 791; Corman, supra note 80. But cf. Rudolph, "The Installment Land Contract as a
junior Security," 54 Mich. L. Rev. 929 (1956).
85 See, e.g., Perkins v. Spencer, 121 'Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952). Cf. Plymouth Sec.
Co. v. Johnson, 335 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. 1960); Bodenheimer, "Forfeitures Under Real
Estate Installment Contracts in Utah," 3 Utah L. Rev. 30 (1952). See also cases cited
5 Corbin §§ 1074, 1129, 1132-34.
86 See, e.g., Paffile v. Sherman, 368 P.2d 434 (Idaho 1962), Uniform Commercial Code
§ 2-718; Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 21; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145-a (layaway sales).
For a more complete description of such legislation see Corman, supra note 80. See also
proposed statutes and studies of the New York Revision Commission 1937. Report of the
Law Revision Commission at 343; 1938 id. at 47; 1942 id. at 181.
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could be argued that he has no right at all, since the availability of
the remedy is discretionary. This argument accords with some of the
definitions of contract which do not specify what legal sanctions must
be available to constitute a contract.s7 On the other hand, the definition
of power of contract suggested herein does not permit this escape:
The power of contract is the availability to a promisee of legal sanctions
adequate to protect his reliance on the promise, to prevent gain by default
and to effectuate expectancies where there may be hidden or unprovable
reliance.
Under this definition the promisee's power of contract includes the
availability of specific performance if other remedies are not adequate
to protect his interests. Of course, the power may be infringed because
of countervailing policies, such as refusal of the courts to use corporal
punishment as a means of achieving specific performance. Yet the refusal may still be an infringement. On the other hand, this definition of
power of contract leads to the conclusion that, whenever other remedies
are adequate to protect the promisee's reliance, restitution, and expectancy interests, there is no curtailment of the power of contract in
refusing specific performance. Thus in theory the usual requirement
that to secure specific performance legal remedies must be inadequate
fits into the above definition of power of contract. It should also be
pointed out that the infringement of power of contract, where other
remedies are inadequate, becomes far more serious should the court
refuse to grant specific performance even though the parties provide
that it shall be available.
The question of "agreed specific performance clauses" apparently
has arisen in court rarely.8" One can speculate on the reasons for this
paucity, but the most likely one is historical. Since specific performance
was an equitable remedy, its prerequisites were jurisdictional.8 9 And
87 1 Williston (3d ed.) § 1, at 1: "A contract is a promise, or set
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which
way recognizes as a duty." See also Restatement, Contracts § 1 (1932).
88 Only the following reported cases were found where such a clause
for injunctive relief was or apparently was incorporated in the contract:

of promises, for
the law in some
or one providing
Stokes v. Moore,

262 Ala. 59, 77 So. 2d 331 (1955); May v. Young, 125 Conn. 1, 2 A.2d 385 (1938);
Stamatiades v. Merit Music Serv. Inc., 210 Md. 597, 124 A.2d 829 (1956) (injunctive
relief); River House Realty Co., Inc. v. Swift, 31 Misc. 2d 55, 218 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct.

N.Y. County 1961) (injunctive relief); Gamble v. Sukut, 208 Ore. 480, 302 P.2d 553
(1956) (agreement to be specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law);
Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Atl. 973 (1902); Worrie v. Boze, 191
Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d 876 (1951). For a large number of cases involving co-operative
marketing agreements providing for specific enforcement and injunctive relief, see Evans
& Stokdyk, The Law of Co-Operative Marketing 125 et seq. (1937); Hanna, Law of
Cooperative Marketing Associations, 229-36 (1931); Hulbert, Legal Phases of Cooperative
Associations 185-94 (1942); Packel, Law of Cooperatives 203 (3d ed. 1956).
89 Professor Chafee argues persuasively that this is not so, not only in a merged system,
but also in an unmerged system. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 301-36 (1950).
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one scarcely went around attempting to confer jurisdiction on the
Chancellor so blatantly. Consequently, the thought of putting such a
provision in a contract would hardly have crossed the common-law
mind, but such provisions are probably becoming more common.90
The few cases considering the problem support the notion that the
courts will treat such clauses as ineffective attempts to confer jurisdiction.9 ' Although the clauses are not necessarily useless,"' the parties
90 See, e.g., Tannenbaum, "Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in the Entertainment Industry," 42 Calif. L. Rev. 18 (1954).
91 In the co-operative marketing contract cases the statute governing marketing cooperatives and their activities commonly provided expressly for specific performance and
injunctive relief. In Oregon Growers' Co-op Ass'n v. Lentz, 107 Ore. 561, 575, 212 Pac. 811
(1923) both the contract and the statute expressly provided for specific performance. The
court said:
The power and jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to hear and determine the question, of
whether the defendant has breached his contract and to award equitable relief in a
proper case where a breach has occurred, exists independently of this or any other
contract.
Id. at 575, 212 Pac. at 816. In Elephant Butte Alfalfa Ass'n v. Rouault, 33 N.M. 136, 262
Pac. 185 (1926) a similar provision apparently was ignored and the court granted specific
performance only after a discussion of the adequacy of the legal remedy and a conclusion
that it was inadequate. In Minnesota Wheat Growers' Co-op Mktg. Ass'n v. Huggins, 162
Minn. 471, 203 N.W. 420 (1925) the court granted specific performance because of the
inadequacy of legal remedies in spite of a liquidated damage clause. It said of a provision
similar to that in the Lentz case: "Such equitable redress is given, regardless of the provision in the contract. Some authorities hold its incorporation, however, of significant
importance." Id. at 486, 203 N.W. at 426. The authority cited for the second sentence
quoted is not in point. In Manchester Dairy Sys. v. Haywood, 82 N.H. 193, 198, 132 At.
12, 14-15 (1926), the court said:
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a controversey cannot be created or conferred by the agreement of the parties. [citations). Therefore authority, if any here,
is to be found, not in the express stipulations for equitable relief, but in the general
principles limiting equitable jurisdiction.
In Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 64, 77 So. 2d 331, 335 (1955) the court said:
We do not wish to express the view that an agreement for the issuance of an injunction, if and when a stipulated state of facts arises in the future is binding on the
court to that extent. Such an agreement would serve to oust the inherent jurisdiction
of the court to determine whether an injunction is appropriate when applied for and
to require its issuance even though to do so would be contrary to the opinion of the
court.
However, the court later says "[T]he provision for an injunction is important in its
influence upon an exercise of the discretionary power of the court to grant a temporary
injunction." Id. at 64, 77 So. 2d at 335.
In Stamatiades v. Merit Music Serv., Inc., 210 Md. 597, 124 A.2d 829 (1956), however,
ambiguous language indicates that the court may have considered the clause to be of some
importance:
They got the $3000 loan, which seems to have been the major objective of their
bargaining with Music Service, and as we understand the contract they expressly agreed
to an injunction on the basis of having received that very consideration.
Id. at 608, 124 A.2d at 834-35.
In Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n v. Patterson, 187 N.C. 252, 121 S.E. 631 (1924) the
court seemed to give some weight to the clause, but it also referred to the statutory
authorization and emphasized the inadequacy of non-specific relief. In Lennox v. Texas
Farm Bureau Cotton Ass'n, 16 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), the dissenting judge
expresses concern that under the majority's interpretation of the contract, "the provision
in the marketing agreement entitling appellee to the remedy of specific performance might
easily become meaningless. . . ." 16 S.W.2d at 423. See also River House Realty Co., Inc. v.
Swift, 31 Misc. 2d 55, 218 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1961) (provision for
injunctive relief). In Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 62 So. 2d 876 (1951) the court mentions
the clause, but does not appear to lean very heavily on it.
92 For example, especially where there is also an agreed damage clause, a clause pro-
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certainly do not have the same power to stipulate effectively for specific
performance that they do to stipulate effectively for liquidated damages.
Historical development of equitable remedies obscures the fact that
the power of contract calls for the granting of specific performance
whenever legal remedies are inadequate to achieve protection of the
reliance, restitution and expectancy interests of the promisee. It is
true that the equitable test of adequacy of legal remedies, fortuitously
or otherwise, tends to cause the decisions to conform to this desideratum,
but, when the parties expressly provide for specific performance, power
of contract calls for granting that relief when there is any doubt of the
efficacy of other available remedies. 3 This is not to suggest that equity
should specifically and positively enforce personal service contracts94
or contracts very difficult to supervise. 5 It should be recognized, however, that where specific performance is denied for any such reason or
because the legal remedy is not clearly inadequate, the power of
contract is infringed, particularly if the parties explicitly provided for
such reliefV6
viding for specific performance makes clear that the parties had no intention of allowing the
defaulter a choice between performing and paying damages. Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59,
77 So. 2d 331 (1955). Thus if the agreed damage clause is in the form of a deposit, retention
may be considered an election barring specific performance; see, e.g., Close v. Blumenthal,
11 Utah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 856 (1960); McMullin v. Shimmin, 10 Utah 2d 142, 349 P.2d 720
(1960). The court might possibly be less likely to find such election if the right to specific
performance were expressly provided for in the instrument.
93 Professor Corbin hopefully suggests that that day has arrived:
T]he impression plainly left by the sum-total of reported cases is that the remedy
of specific enforcement is as available as other remedies, now that in almost all jurisdictions all remedies are to be sought in a single system of courts and no longer in
separate and mutually suspicious courts of common law and courts of chancery.
Objections on the ground of inadequacy of money damages are less often made than
formerly and are given less consideration by the judges.
5 Corbin § 1142, at 636.
See also the statement of Mr. justice Butler in a different context in Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923): "[Tlhe legal remedy must be as complete, practical and efficient
as that which equity could afford." The recent survey by Professor Van Hecke reveals a
good deal of statutory and case support for the views of Professor Corbin. Van Hecke,
"Changing Emphases in Specific Performance," 40 N.C.L. Rev. 1-13 (1961). But see
generally, Newman, Equity and Law: A Comparative Study 59-67 (1961):
"Adequate" does not mean complete compensation for the wrong. It means merely
good enough for the Chancellor to be satisfied that no extreme hardship will result
from leaving the plaintiff to his remedy in damages. . . . The use of the word "adequate"
should not lead us to believe that it means "best" or even that it means what it says.

Id. at 62.
94 But see Matter of Staklinski, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959)

(motion to confirm an arbitration award granting reinstatement of a manager in charge of
production and engineering); Note, 45 Corn. L.Q. 580 (1960).
95 See, however, Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377,
202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960), where the court affirmed an arbitration award ordering specific
performance of a contract to construct and lease a five million dollar building. See also
Note, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 744 (1961). For discussion of the loosening of traditional reluctance

to grant specific performance of extensive and personal service contracts, see Van Hecke,
supra note 93, at 13-22 (1961).

96 A court desiring to uphold the power of contract where the parties stipulate for
specific performance even though legal remedies are not sufficiently inadequate to meet
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FEES AND OTHER LEGAL EXPENSES

A large gap in the legal protection afforded the reliance, restitution
and expectancy interests of the promisee is his inability to recover most
of his costs of securing that protection. 97 Since the promisee's gross
recovery is the amount necessary to compensate him for his losses
(although not necessarily if the measure is restitution), his net recovery
of course will not do so. This is not the place to discuss the soundness
of the American rule which generally disallows recovery of attorneys'
fees and many other legal expenses,9" but the denial of such fees and
expenses in contract cases is an infringement of power of contract.
These infringements become more serious if the court refuses to enforce
the parties' explicit agreement that a defaulter shall pay reasonable
attorneys' fees or other reasonable costs of collecting the claim from him.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts generally uphold provisions
for reasonable attorneys' fees 99 even though such clauses probably most
often appear in contracts of adhesion. The requirement of reasonableness
effectively precludes the parties from doing more than restoring the adequate protection of the reliance, restitution and expectancy interests
which the denial of attorneys' fees would prevent.
ARBITRATION

Thus far, the types of clauses discussed have been concerned primarily with the substance of contractual relief. Of course, all of them
have had procedural aspects; for example, a valid liquidated damage
clause eases plaintiff's burden of proof, but these procedural aspects
were secondary. One type of provision, however, concerned primarily
with the way in which a remedy is sought rather than with the nature
of the remedy, is arbitration.
traditional equitable tests could find support by analogy to cases involving waiver of the
adequacy requirement. See generally McClintock, Principles of Equity § 41 (2d ed. 1948);
19 Am. Jur., Equity § 26 (1939); 30 CJ.S., Equity, § 88 (1942); Note, 11 Texas L. Rev.
548 (1933). See Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 301-36 (1950) for additional analogous
authority.
If effect is given to an agreement providing for equitable relief, the agreement usually
automatically operates as a waiver of a jury trial. This fact calls for caution in the application of the position advocated herein, especially in contracts of adhesion, to avoid giving
effect to unintentional waivers of such a valuable right. See Chafee, supra at 324-32.
The problems in insolvency or bankruptcy created by rights to specific performance would
of course arise more often if specific performance became more widely available through
agreement. See generally 4 Collier, Bankruptcy §§ 60.50 and 70.62 (14th ed. 1942).
97 But in Spuches v. Royal View, Inc., 13 App. Div. 2d 523, 212 N.Y.S.2d 394 (2d Dep't
1961) the court denying specific performance of a land contract because of conveyance to a
third person, allowed recovery of the down payment and (apparently) the attorneys'
reasonable legal fees throughout the trial and appeal. See also McCormick § 63.
98 Professor McCormick concludes that such fees should be allowed. McCormick § 71.
99 McCormick § 69; for collections of authority see 3 CCH Condit. Sales-Chat. Mort.
Rep. ffff9401-9459; Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 288 (1951).
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Refusal to give effect to agreements to arbitrate constitutes an infringement of the power of contract if the law does not otherwise
provide sanctions adequate to protect the reliance, restitution, and expectancy interests of the party seeking arbitration. Arbitration may
provide sanctions not otherwise adequate to protect those interests.
It is argued that arbitration is less expensive than trial, that there is
less delay, that the proceedings are less technical, and that the "inexpert jury system" is escaped.' 00 Arbitration is often a more satisfactory system for handling alleged breaches if the contractual relations
of the parties are of a continuing nature. 101 Arbitration may also make
it easier for parties to ensure that the customs of their business govern
the result in that an arbitrator knowing the business makes the decision.
Thus the pitfalls of an extreme objective interpretation are avoided.
Another advantage to the parties is the privacy of arbitration hearings. 0 2
While the foregoing arguments cannot necessarily be proved sound
in every case, nevertheless, the parties apparently think they are, and
it would be difficult to prove them wrong in the face of crowded
calendars and not always informed and skillful judges and juries. Thus
arbitration clauses arguably give the parties needed protection which
the law cannot or does not supply. This being the case, the power of
contract is infringed if the courts do not enforce the provisions by
whatever means are necessary to make them effective.
It is not intended to suggest that an arbitration provision allowing an
arbitrator to alter the nature of contract, for example, by assessing a
penalty for a breach, °3 or that a decision of an arbitrator which does
100 6 Williston (rev. ed.) § 1922, at 5377.
101 The epitome of this is the collective bargaining agreement.
102 Gotshal, "Arbitration's Importance to the Lawyer," 1 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. R. 151

(1960). Whether the public interest is served by lending legal sanctions to such secrecy is
beyond the scope of this article.
See Mentschikoff, "Commercial Aribtration," 61 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1961) which refers
to individuated arbitration as follows:
Although we do not know, we believe that the chief moving factors here are; (1)
a desire for privacy . . . ; (2) the availability of expert deciders; (3) the avoidance
of possible legal difficulties with the nature of the transaction itself; and (4) the
random acceptance by many businessmen of the idea that arbitration is faster and
less expensive than court action.
Id. at 849.
103 Thus, the court refused to confirm an award granting punitive damages for breach
in Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 280 App. Div. 500, 114
N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dep't 1952). The punitive damages were in addition to actual damages
as found by the arbitrators and were two and one-half -times as big. See generally, Note, 109
U. Pa. L. Rev. 744 (1961). But cf. Matter of Exercycle Corp., 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d
463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, (1961); 75 Harv. L. Rev. 835 (1962), 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 214
(1962); 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 113 (1961). An employee entered into an employment agreement containing an arbitration clause. After the employee worked under the agreement for
several years the employer fired him in violation of the agreement to employ him for life.
The employee asked to arbitrate, but the employer sought to stay the aribtration on the
ground that the contract was lacking in mutuality. The appellate division affirmed the
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so, must be enforced to avoid infringing the power of contract. It is
not essential to the power of contract to permit the arbitrator to do
more than protect the reliance, restitution, and expectancy interests
of the wronged party. These interests provide a clue perhaps to where
the courts (or the legislature) should draw the line in allowing judicial
review of substantive decisions of arbitrators. If the arbitrator has
attempted to turn the contract tool into something more binding than
the law provides and the award is more than necessary to protect the
foregoing interests of the complaining party, then the court should
refuse to enforce the award. This is not simply or even primarily
because the agreement or award is unfair or harsh, but because society,
through the law, does not provide an instrument to accomplish such
goals. In short, society will not create a consensual status except within
the limits suggested.
In this area courts often infringe the power of contract by their
denial of the motion on the ground that the contract was not lacking in mutuality. 11 App.
Div. 2d 677, 201 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1st Dep't 1960). The Court of Appeals affirmed, the
majority (four judges) holding that the question of mutuality was for the arbitrators to
decide. Two concurring judges (Froessel and Van Voorhis, JJ.) and a dissenting judge
(Dye, J.) maintained that the question of mutuality could not be referred to the arbitrators
but must be decided by the court, since the very authority of the arbitrators depended upon
the existence of a valid contract. The majority view would allow the arbitrators to change
the nature of contract rather substantially in that they can apparently enforce a nudum
pactum if they so desire. It is interesting to note, however, that the decision is not authority
for such an alteration of the definition of contract that the definition suggested herein is
no longer apt:
A contract is a promise given legal sanction adequate to: (1) protect reliance on the
promise by the promisee; (2) prevent gain by default on the promise; and (3) effectuate expectancies created by the promise (a) where there may be hidden reliance or (b)
where socially desired reliance may thereby be promoted.
The decision of the majority does postulate the existence of a promise and gives no indication that remedies granted by the arbitrators can do more than accomplish the foregoing
purposes. The Court of Appeals has reaffirmed the majority position in De Laurentas v.
Cinematografica de las Americas, S.A., 9 N.Y.2d 503, 174 N.E.2d 736, 215 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1961).
In East India Trading Co. v. Halari, 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E.2d 213 (1953), with no
opinion except that of one dissenter, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court
enforcing an arbitrator's award, 280 App. Div. 420, 114 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1st Dep't 1952). The
contract in question provided for a recovery of the difference between market value and
contract price on the day of default and "a penalty, as determined by arbitrators, of not
less than 2% and not more than 101 of the market value . . . as of the date of default.
*.." The arbitrators had awarded 2%. This case cannot be cited for the proposition that
the court will enforce an arbitrator's award of a penalty because it is not at all clear that
the so-called penalty was in excess of the damages which were incurred by the plaintiff. As
the majority in the appellate division said:
Judicial notice can be taken of the expense of litigation and the inadequacy of
ordinary costs. While we have not adopted a policy of awarding compensatory costs
in our court system, there is no reason why in the private forums of trade arbitration
a reasonable system of compensatory costs or something of that nature should not be
established and recognized. Furthermore, the difference between the contract price and
market price may not reflect the full measure of damage and giving the arbitrators
some latitude to add to that amount is fair.
Id. at 421, 114 N.Y.S.2d at 94.
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refusal to grant specific performance of contracts to arbitrate in the
future or to stay proceedings brought in violation of the agreement.
Since common-law remedies for breach of contract to arbitrate future
disputes are generally, although not always, ineffective, these refusals
in effect destroy the legal force of such agreements. 0 4 This situation
has been partly remedied in most jurisdictions by statute, and specific
performance and stay of proceedings are available for enforcement of
agreements complying with the statute. 10 5 Nevertheless, there are numerous situations in which neither stay of proceedings nor specific
performance is available. 106 There does seem to be some tendency,
however, in view of legislative changes, to favor such executory clauses
even though there is no applicable local statute.0 7 The theory of the
Nevada court in such a case, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Stine,108
is that the old hostility to arbitration clauses is a judicial anachronism.
While this conclusion may or may not be sound (some notable commentators urge caution in these matters), 1°9 this is not the place to discuss the
merits of various limitations on arbitration. As suggested above, however, agreements to arbitrate disputes, future or present, can nevertheless be judged in terms of the power of contract. As long as the parties
are seeking only the procedural advantages of arbitration or substantive
advantages which do not change the basic nature of contract, it is an
infringement of the power of contract to refuse whatever sanctions are
needed to enforce their agreement, and that fact should be considered
by the court when making its decision to withhold or grant enforcement. If, on the other hand, the parties or the arbitrator seek to do
more than protect the reliance, restitution, and expectancy interests of a
wronged party, there is no infringement of the power of contract if the
court calls a halt to the effort. The court's decision need not be justified on
any policy of preventing harshness or unfairness, the only policy in
question being society's decision of what constitutes the contract tool.
104 In many jurisdictions agreements to arbitrate all future disputes are said to be
completely void, or it is said that only nominal damages can be recovered for their breach.
6 Corbin § 1433, at 729; 6 Williston (rev. ed.) § 1919. See Restatement, Contracts § 550
(1932). In many situations, however, ways are found to avoid such a doctrine, e.g., by
finding the agreement to be one to appraise or value rather than to arbitrate-a nebulous
distinction. See 6 Corbin § 1442.
105 See Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations and Awards §§ 308-59 (1930); 6 Williston
(rev. ed.) § 1920; Simpson, "Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts," 83 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 160 (1934).
106 6 Corbin § 1433; 6 Williston (rev. ed.) § 1919.
107 See United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Stine, 76 Nev. 189, 351 P.2d 96 (1960) and cases
cited therein.
105 Ibid.
109 See, e.g., 6 Corbin § 1433; 6 Williston (rev. ed.) § 1919.
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CONCLUSION

The foregoing subjects of discussion were selected as important illustrations of the relationship between freedom of contract and attempts
by parties to a contract to agree ahead of time on the consequences
of failure of a party to perform. With the exception of arbitration the
various means selected have had to do primarily with what the remedy
would be rather than with the way in which it would be secured." 0
The various means by which parties to contracts seek to ease the way
in which the remedy can be secured are numerous enough to require
an article by themselves."' Arbitration was selected as the most important from among these means to illustrate that similar principles
apply to these agreements as to those which define the remedy itself.
The decisions of the courts concerning the effect of agreed remedy
clauses seem to permit the following generalizations: Where the law
can and does supply remedies adequate to protect the promisee's reliance, restitution, and expectancy interests, the courts will not enforce
attempts by the parties to provide for additional sanctions. Where the
law is inadequate to protect those interests, the courts tend to permit
the parties to provide for additional sanctions. The decisions thereby
permit us to define contract in terms of sanctions adequate to protect
those interests, and freedom of contract as the power to secure those
adequate sanctions, but to secure nothing more.
110 The subjects selected by no means exhaust the possibilities. Acceleration clauses in
notes for example are "substantive" in this sense, although at the same time nicely illustrating the impossibility of separating completely a remedy from the procedure by which it
can be secured.
Ill Among other things a party may attempt: a) to limit jurisdiction to a particular
court; see 2 Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 13-806 (1949); 1 N.D. Rev. Code §§ 9-0805 (1943);
15 Okla. Stat. Ann. § 216 (1937); 1 S.D. Code § 10.0705 (1939); 6 Corbin § 1445; 6
Williston (rev ed.) § 1725; Bergman, "Contractual Restrictions On the Forum," 48 Calif.
L. Rev. 438 (1960); Note, 45 Cornell L.Q. 364 (1960); cf. Restatement, Contracts § 558
(1932) ; b) to appoint someone his agent for receipt of service of process in connection with
any matter arising out of the contract; (c) to permit another party to confess judgment on
his behalf; 6 Williston (rev. ed.) § 1724; for a collection of state law see 3 CCH Condit.
Sale-Chat. Mort. Rep. gff 9401-9459; (d) to waive the statute of limitations or to provide
that the period for bringing suit shall be shorter than that provided by the applicable
statute of limitations; Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725; Montana, North Dakota,
Oklahoma and South Dakota statutes cited supra; 2, 3 N.D. Rev. Code §§ 26-1310, 36-2005
(1943); 1 Corbin § 218; 6 Williston (rev. ed.) § 1722; Note, 23 Cornell L.Q. 607
(1938) ; Bogert, Britton, and Hawkland, Cases on Sales and Security p. 628 (4th ed. 1962)
(e) to waive jury trial; see, e.g., Federal Housecraft, Inc. v. Faria, 28 Misc. 2d 155, 216
N.Y.S.2d 113 (2d Dep't 1961); 6 Williston (rev. ed) § 1722; (f) to alter rules of evidence
which would otherwise obtain, 1 Wigmore Evidence § 7a (3d ed. 1940); 6 Williston (rev.
ed.) § 1723. See generally Uniform Commercial § 2-719, and comments thereto; Bunn,
"Freedom of Contract under the Uniform Commercial Code," 2 B.C. Ind. & Comm. L.R.
59 (1960); Isaacs, "Contractual Control Over Adjective Law: Recent Developments," 83
U. Pa. L. Rev. 177 (1934).

